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Report nowFuel shortages, forced conscription, growing discontent: How deep is Russia’s crisis—and how dangerous could this become for President Vladimir Putin? An overview.
Four and a half years after the invasion of Ukraine, Russia is also in the midst of a deep domestic crisis. The Kremlin’s previously quite successful attempt to keep the war out of the public consciousness has been thrown into disarray by Ukrainian attacks on refineries and oil terminals. To what extent are fuel shortages and political unrest shaking Putin’s self-image and his support among the population? The most important questions and answers about the current situation.
In the summer of 2026, Russia is gripped by a deep structural crisis. According to experts and the statistics, the country’s economic and industrial foundations have been shaken.
According to research by the U.S. think tank Energy Intelligence, Russian oil refining in June 2026 plummeted by a quarter, marking the lowest level in more than twenty years. Experts at the analysis firm say that Russia is heading toward what could be the worst fuel crisis in its history, similar to the "Deutsche Welle" reports.
According to this, the economic strain is also exacerbated by the fact that the remaining production—currently around 85,000 metric tons of gasoline per day—is meeting a summer peak demand of 110,000 metric tons.
On top of that, the national budget must absorb the massive military spending, which is why the government already raised the value-added tax from 20 to 22 percent in January 2026 and drastically increased the tax burden on small and medium-sized enterprises, as reported by “The Conversation” reports. According to the magazine’s analysis, this has led to a deliberate drying up and shrinking of the civilian sector in favor of the military-industrial complex.
In the daily lives of the Russian people, the crisis is most evident in the severe shortage of gasoline and diesel. The fuel crisis is now paralyzing logistics throughout the country.
According to "Deutsche Welle" reports from the independent Russian news platform “Vyorstka” and the business media outlet “RBC” indicate that strict fuel rationing or sales restrictions have now had to be introduced in at least 40 and potentially up to 78 regions of the country.
At gas stations—even in Moscow, the wealthy and well-supplied capital—kilometer-long lines are forming. According to social media reports, physical altercations are becoming more frequent, as reported by the BBC, among others. In some places, militias have had to be deployed to maintain order at gas stations.
In Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, the governor appointed by Moscow, had to admit on Telegram that the situation remains tense and that on some days, no fuel at all can be sold to private individuals.
In remote regions such as Siberia, local authorities have already been forced to set up portable toilets along the roadsides for waiting motorists, according to the British broadcaster. In many places, filling up fuel canisters is strictly prohibited; bus service and municipal garbage collection have been drastically reduced; and the agricultural sector is deeply concerned about the upcoming summer harvest due to the shortage.
Those who can afford it are heading to neighboring Kazakhstan or China, where, according to media reports, gas tourism is said to be thriving.
In addition, the war harbors further potential for internal conflict: The ongoing pressure to forcibly recruit soldiers for the front lines is causing widespread discontent and eroding public support. As reported by “The Economist» reports, open complaints from Russian influencers about the devastating conditions and the purpose of the war are going viral rapidly on social media.
According to *The Economist*, many Russians increasingly feel as though they are stuck in a dead end. This ambivalence is increasingly reflected in measurable pessimism: Representative surveys by the independent Levada Center show that rising inflation is the country’s most pressing problem for well over half of the Russian population, as reported by *Tagesschau*, for example.
According to the latest data from the Gallup polling organization, Russians are more pessimistic about their economy than they have been in two decades, the BBC reports. A full 60 percent of those surveyed said that economic conditions in their area are steadily worsening.
According to the BBC, political scientist Nina Khrushchova of The New School also notes a deep-seated sense of resignation among the general public, which makes the possibility of the people bringing about a regime change seem rather unlikely.
While Putin’s power has so far appeared stable and resignation still seems to prevail among the people, the crisis is taking its toll. According to the BBC, even state-controlled polls, such as those conducted by the VCIOM Institute, recorded a sudden drop in public confidence in Putin of 3.4 percentage points in just one week in July.
The Levada Center reported that the percentage of people who believe the country is on the “right path” fell to 52 percent, compared with 61 percent the previous month.
The regime’s growing nervousness is particularly evident in a shift in rhetoric. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, otherwise known for his measured choice of words, let slip the term “war”—which he usually avoids—in light of the burning refineries: “It’s a war, a real war. It all began as a special military operation, but it’s continuing like a war.”
Even Vladimir Putin himself was forced to publicly acknowledge “certain fuel shortages” on state television for the first time in late June, although he tried to portray them as “not critical.” At a subsequent cabinet meeting, he stated that the opposition wanted to stir up anxiety in society but would not be able to succeed in doing so.
Hoping to ease the growing pressure, the Kremlin is seeking help both at home and abroad—but is encountering increasing resistance in the process.
On the domestic front, Putin is trying to preempt social unrest through direct financial interventions, such as the emergency subsidies he provided in early July to the crisis-stricken population of Crimea.
In terms of foreign policy, Moscow wants to involve its closest ally, Belarus, more closely in the war against Ukraine, but is being thwarted by Belarusian President Lukashenko, as analyzed, for example, by the "Washington Post" analyzes. The dictator stubbornly refuses to send his troops into what he calls a “bloodbath.”
Instead, Lukashenko is seeking protection in Beijing, as China has a massive interest in the unimpeded transit of its goods through Belarus. In addition, in March 2026, Minsk brokered a deal with the Trump administration through U.S. Special Envoy John Cole.
Since the traditional political opposition within the country has been systematically eliminated, the only remaining realistic force for political change is emerging from within the economic elite.
In this context, Russia’s biggest industrial and fertilizer magnate, Andrei Melnichenko, caused quite a stir. In an interview marathon lasting nearly 60 hours with magazine *The Economist*, he broke the oligarchs’ silence and issued a stark warning about the country’s internal “rot.” The tycoons could no longer ignore the tyranny.
Melnichenko outlines grim scenarios for Russia’s future should Putin’s regime continue: total collapse into anarchy under regional warlords; complete degradation into an insignificant raw-materials vassal of China; or a transition into a permanently isolated, totalitarian “fortress” like North Korea, which is in a permanent state of war with the rest of the world.
Although Melnitschenko does not explicitly call for Putin's immediate ouster, he advocates for the decentralization of power and the transfer of leadership to predictable, economically minded technocrats and business leaders.
10.07.2026, 19:53
11.07.2026, 08:59
